





Working Paper No. 3910




We have received helpful comments from Menzie Chinri, Angelo
Melino, Maurice Obstfeld, David Parsley, seminar participants at
UC Berkeley and NBER Summer Institute, and especially. David
Bates, Richard Levich, Richard Meese and David Romer. We would
also like to thank the Pacific Basin Center -for Economic and
Monetary Studies of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for
help with the manuscript. We are responsible for any errors in
the paper, except for the white noise. This paper is part of
NBER's research programs in Asset Pricing and International
Studies. Anyopinionsexpressed are those of the authors and not
those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3910
November 1991
AREOPTION-IMPLIEDFORECASTS OF
EXCHANGE RAPE VOLATILITY EXCESSIVELY VARIABLE?
ABSTRACT
Market participants' forecasts of future exchange rate
volatility can be recovered from option contracts on foreign
currencies. Such implicit volatility forecasts for four
currencies are used to test rational expectations jointly with
the applicability of the standard Black-Scholes formula. First,
we examine the null hypothesis that the market-anticipated
one-month-ahead standard deviation is an unbiased estimator of
the subsequent realized standard deviation. The parametric
regression method rejects this hypothesis overwhelmingly: the
implicit forecasts are themselves excessively variable.
Simulations indicate that the rejection is not caused by
non-normality of the error term. Second, we use a nonparametric
method to test a weaker version of market rationality: the market
can correctly forecast the direction of the change in exchange
rate volatility. This time, the weaker version of rationality is
confirmed- Third, we investigate how market forecasts are
formed. We find some evidence that market participants put heavy
weight on lagged volatility when forecasting future volatility.
Finally, results from the Alternating Conditional Expectations
algorithm provide further support for the central finding that
when the market predicts a large deviation of volatility from its
mean, it could do better by moderating its forecast.
Shang-Jin Wei Jeffrey A. Frankel
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of California University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720 Berkeley, CA 94720
and NEER"It would be wise to cut expectations in half."
Anonymous, from a fortune cookie in a Chinese restaurant
Section 1 Introduction
While there are by now hundreds of tests of rational
expectations in financial markets, most do not specify what the
alternative hypothesis is.Bilson (1981) and Froot (1989) have
specified an alternative hypothesis: the proposition that investors'
forecasts have a tendency to be excessively variable.In other
words, when their forecast is high it is on average too high and
when it is low it is on average too low; investors would do better
by placing more weight on the long run average value of the price
they are trying to forecast. As unattractive as a rejection of
rational expectations is to economists on a priori grounds, there
is evidence to support it.'
In the foreign exchange market, the evidence concerns
investors' estimates of the expected future spot rate.Tryon
(1979), Longworth (1981), Bilson (1981) and others measure the
expedted future change in the spot rate by the discount in the
forward exchange market, and find that the estimates are biased in
the direction of excessive variability.2 Frankel and Froot (1987)
'Froot(1989) andFrankel and Stock (1987) describe how this evidence relates to the variance bounds
tests of SMiler(1981) andLeRoy and Porter(1981).
2 The problem with these results as a test of rational
expectations is the possibility of a risk premium. In other words,
in detennining the forward rate, risk-averse investors may add a
risk premium to their forecasts of future spot rates, which would
causethe forward rate to be a biased forecast of the future spot
rate even if the investors' forecast is unbiased. Other tests that
find bias in the forward rate include Fama (1984) and Hsieh (1984).
1and Froot and Frankel (1989) measure the expected future change in
thespotrate by survey data, and find the same bias.3
Inthis paper, we use options data to examine the analogous
excess—variabilityhypothesis for the case of the second moment of
exchange rates.4 That is, we test that investors could do better
in their forecasts of the variance by putting more weight on the
long—nfl average value.Options data provide a relatively clean
test because the options pricing formula is derived from a
no—arbitrage argument and investors' forecasts of volatility are the
only quantity not directly observed by an econometrician. It must
be acknowledged that, here too, it is a joint hypothesis that we are
testing: there could be a failure of one of the assumptions of the
Black—Scholes formula, such as the assumption that the spot rate
follows a diffusion process. But even if a rejection of the null
hypothesis were due to a failure of an auxiliary assumption, it
would still be an important finding, as it would still mean that it
is dangerous to rely on options prices' implicit volatilities as
forecasts of future variances.
It would be disturbing to conclude that the market's
expectations are completely foolish.In the second stage of the
test, we look at a weaker version of rationality: the market can
correctly predict the direction of the change in exchange rate
A problem with these results is that many readers are
skeptical of survey data because, among other reasons, investors may
strategically misrepresent themselves in a survey. In contrast, the
forecasts of future volatility implicit in options prices are used
by traders in executing actual trading.
Stein (1989)examines the term structure of the
option-implied volatility in stocks, and finds that the short—tern
stock volatility tends to overreact relative to the long—term
volatility.
2volatility. A nonparametric method is used to examine the weaker
criterion of rationality. Here, the market expectations are found
to be informative about subsequent events.
There exists a relatively small empirical literature testing
the efficiency of foreign exchange options prices.Using a
simulation method, Eorensztein and Dooley (1987) found bias in the
foreign exchange option data, namely, that there are deviations from
the Black—Scholes values for call options that are deep "out of the
money."(In contrast, the option data used in this paper are
entirely those that are closest to being at the money.)The
direction of the bias was an apparent overvaluation of the option,
implying an overestimation of the likelihood of change in the value
of the dollar.Similarly, Bodurtha and Courtadon (1987) find a
(small) bias toward apparent overpricing of call and put options on
foreign exchange, which is equivalent to apparent overestimation of
volatility. Bates (1990) argues that an asymmetric jump-diffusion
process is more appropriate than the standard processes assumed for
the spot rate. lie, like Borensztein and IJooley, examines data from
the mid—1980s and believes that the apparent failure of the Black—
Scholes formula to fit out—of—the—money options is attributable to
market perceptions in each period of a certain probability that the
dollar will plunge in value.Melino and Turnbull (1991) allow for
the spot rate process to differ from the standard log—normal, but
again find that the options prices overestimate volatility.
Among other papers using data on foreign exchange options,
Lyons(1988) has estimated option-implied volatilities for three
currencies and used them in a test of time—varying risk premium in
the forward discount, though this was not a test of whether the
3implied volatility is an unbiased estimator of the future realized
volatility. Wei (1991) uses implied exchange rate volatility to
examinethe effects of anticipated volatility on bid-ask spreads in
foreign exchange markets; an increase in anticipated volatility is
found to widen the spreads.
Thebalance of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
describes the data source and selection criteria, as well as the
formula used in extracting market-anticipated volatility. Based on
these estimates, Section 3 examines, through a parametric
regression, if the implied standard deviation is an unbiased
estimator of the realized one,It also uses simulations to
determinehow sensitive the size of the test in a small sample is
to non-normal distributions of the error term. Section 4 tests a
weaker version of rationality with a nonparainetric method. Section
5 looks closely at the formation of the market anticipation and
possible patterns of the expectational errors. Section 6 uses the
techniqueof Alternating Conditional Expectations to test further
the proposition that emerged from Section 3, namely that market
participants would do better if their forecasts put more weight on
the long—run average volatility. Finally, section 7 reviews the
findings.
Section 2 Estimating the market anticipated exchange volatility
2.1 Data Description
Currency option trading started at the end of 1982 on the
Philadelphia Exchange. In 1985, the Chicago Board of Exchange also
began to trade currency options. The data used in this study are
4of options on the Philadelphia Exchange from February of 1983 to
January of 1990. Early trading was very thin. The first few months
of data might give unreliable estimates of the standard deviations,
and so are discarded. The source of the option and spot exchange
rate data is various issues of the Wall Street Journal. The data
are described as follows.
(1) The four most heavily traded currency options: British
Pound, West German Mark, Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc, all relative
to the US Dollar.
(2) call options (American style) that are closest to being at
the money. These options are most heavily traded and thus yield
more reliable estimates of implied volatility.
(3) contracts signed on the third Wednesday of each month.
(4)Ifpossible, contracts that matured in the following month.
Otherwise, contracts with the next nearest maturity.
(5) The closing quote for the spot exchange rates on the same
day the option contract is signed and on the same Exchange.
The interest rates are: the 3—month Treasury Bill rate for the
United States, and call money rates for the other four countries.
The source is OECD Main Economic Indicators. Daily exchange rates
are used to calculate the realized standard deviations in the spot
exchange rates.They are the closing bid rates in the London
market. The data are from Data Resource Inc.'s financial database.
2.2 The Valuation Model
Onemodel commonly used by the market in calculating European
currency option value is the Garman-Kohlhagen (1983) formula, which
is equivalent to a version of Black—Scholes formula for options on
5a stock which pays a continuous stream of dividends (with the
foreign interest rate essentially substituted for the dividend
rate).Underlying the Garmãn-Kohlhagen formula is the assumption
regarding the stochastic process governing the asset on which the
optionis written. Let the spot exchange rate be S(t), which gives
units of domestic currency per unit 'of foreign currency. S(t) is
assumed to follow a log normal process.
dS(t)/S(t) =udt+adw(t) (1)
where iiisits instantaneous mean rate of change, 55 thestandard
deviation of the instantaneous rate of change, and w(t) is a
standard Wiener process. By Ito's lemma, lnS(t) —lnS(O) (U— 0.5
a2) t+aw(t). In other words, for all j >
E{Ln S(t+j) —Ln5(t) I 5(t) } =(u—0.5o)j
Var{ La S(t+j) —LnS(t) / S(t) } =a2j (2)
Given the process for 8(t) in (1), the Garman—Xohlhagen value
of a European call option on foreign exchange is given by the
following expression:
C[ 8(t), K, T, i, i, a
=8(t)exp[_i*(T_t)] N( d +o(T-t)°5)—Kexp[—i(T—t)] N(d) (3)
with the following definitions:
C(.) the value of the call option
5(t) current spot exchange rate
6K —strikeprice
P maturitydate
j. instantaneousdomestic nominal interest rate
j* instantaneous foreign nominal interest rate
market anticipated standard deviation from time t
to maturity T,thesame aasin (1).
d —— LnfS(t/K1+(i— — 0.5a2.(T—t
a
N(.) thevalue of the cumulative normal distribution
function.
One property of (3) that will be frequently used in the next
section is that the call value is an increasing function of a. The
more volatile the spot exchange rate is, the more likely is the spot
rate to exceed the strike price during the specified time interval,
and hence the more valuable is the option to buy foreign currency
at that price.
We use American options in our study, because European option
trading started in 1985 and thus has too short a history for time
series analysis. Unfortunately, there is no closed—form solution
such as (3) for the American options. However, as long as early
exercise is not heavy, the value of American call and European call
are known to be very close. Some random checking of the values of
European and American calls with the same striking price and
maturity date reveals that they are indeed quite close. Buttler
(1989) and Adams and Wyatt (1989) have independently shownthrough
simulations that when the domestic interest rate is higher than the
foreign interest rate, the prices of a European and an American call
are identical. Furthermore, the difference between the values of
the two types of call options is small when the domestic interest
7rate is equal to or slightly lower than the foreign interest rate.5
Throughout our sample, the US interest rate was higher than the
Japanese, German and Swiss interest rates (though it was not higher
than the British interest rate). Therefore, we do not expect the
errors resulting from use of the European formula to be serious.
But the appropriateness of the European option feature, and other
aspects of the Garman—Kohlhagen formula, should be considered to be
part of the joint null hypothesis. In any case, future research
could consider using some numerical approximation method such as the
binomial model to improve the estimates of the implied volatility.
There are two other potential sources of error in applying the
Garman—Kohlhagen (GK) formula to price currency options. Both have
to do with the assumption regarding the spot exchange rate process.
With either one of these two complications, currency options can no
longer be priced by a no—arbitrage argument. Indeed, there can be
no generally agreed—upon method to price options in such cases,
since it would have to depend critically on the particular
specification of the jump process or the volatility process.
First, volatility is assumed to be non-random, but could in
principle also follow a stochastic process. Wiggins (1987) and Hull
and White (1987) are among those who have analyzed the effect of
stochastic volatility on proper pricing of options. The effect is
to introduce a risk premium into the option—pricing formula. Nelino
and Turnbull (1990) argue that allowing for this risk premium to be
non—zero (though constant) sharply reduces the magnitude of apparent
errors in pricing foreign exchange options (though there is no
evident guarantee that this premium is in fact related to risk in
the proper way, as opposed to being merely a free parameter that
helps to fit the data).
Hull and White (1987) and Ng (1991) show that under certain
special conditions (volatility instantaneously uncorrelated with
aggregate Consumption), the risk premium becomes zero.In that
See also Shastri and Tandon (1985) and Jorion and Stoughton
(1987).
8case, a version of the Black—Scholes formula with the average
volatility over the interval of the option substituted for the known
volatility becomes appropriate.One can interpret the null
hypothesis considered in this paper to be the joint hypothesis
consisting of this uncorrelatedness assumption regarding the spot
rate process together with the proposition that the forecast of
average volatility for each interval is unbiased.
The second potential source of error is that, while the GE
formula assumes the exchange rate process to be a lognormal or
diffusion process, it could in reality be a mixture of diffusion and
jump processes (Jorion, 1988). As mentioned earlier, Borensztein
and Dooley (1987) and Bates (1990) attribute the finding of apparent
overvaluation in out—of—the—money options to the existence of a jump
process, and specifically to the perceived possibility in the mid—
1980s of a future large depreciation of the dollar.It has also
been argued that a jump process is particularly plausible when one
takes into account frequent government intervention in foreign
exchange markets (Ball and Roma, 1990).
The present paper differs from earlier studies of bias in that
the options examined are at the money (or close to it), which we
suspect makes the possibility of a jump process less important as
a potential source of apparent bias- The assumption that the spot
rate follows a diffusion process, nevertheless, is part of the joint
null hypothesis that we test.
2.3 Estimation of the implied volatility and comparison with the
realized volatility
Given S(t), K, T, i and 1*, equation (3) defines an implicit
function in the market estimate of the standard deviation a.
Wecan rewrite (3) as
g(a) =C(S,K,T,i,i*,a)— C=0. (4)
9Notice thatappears (with different powers) in the numerator
and the denominator of d, which in turn is an argument of the
cumulative normal function. Because (4) is a non-linear equation,
the Gauss-Newton iteration method is used to solve for a.
Thecorresponding monthly series of the realized standard
deviation is computed from daily exchange rates. Let Log 5(j) be
the log of the spot rate on day j.Then the realized standard
deviation (rsd) for a given month is defined as the standard
deviation of changes in the logarithm of the daily spot rate, Log
S(j+1) -Log5(j), from the third Wednesday of the month to the
third Wednesday of the following month. Notice that this definition
is consistent with the assumption regarding the stochastic process
of the spot rate, as given in (2).Plots of the option-implied
volatility against ex post realized volatility for each of the four
currencies are presented in Figure 1.
The means of the four implied volatility are: British pound,
0.00592; Deutche Mark, 0.00618; Japanese yen, 0.00520; and Swiss
franc, 0.00616. In comparison, the means of the realized volatility
are: British pound, 0.00586; Deutche Mark; 0.00667, Japanese yen,
0.00568; and Swiss franc, 0.00700. Notice that the four implied
volatility are lower than the corresponding realized ones. This
suggests that at-the—money options are not "overpriced" compared to
deep—in—the—money or deep—out—of—the—money options.
One shortcoming of the data is that the call prices, spot
exchange rates and interest rates are not exactly time—synchronized.
In future, we will use time—stamped transaction data to improve in
this regard as well as to expand the sample size.
Section 3: A parametric test of strong rationality.
The hypothesis tested in this sectionisthat the
market—anticipated standard deviation is an unbiased estimator of
the subsequent realized one. We require that the market notonly
get the direction of change correctly, but also get the magnitude
10of change correctly on average. In section 4, we will test a weaker
notion of rationality, which only requires that investors are on
average on the right side of the market.
3.1Testsof the unbiasednessof theisdbasedon linearregressions
Totest formallythe hypothesis that isd is an unbiased
predictorof the future rsd, consider the following regression:
rsd,1=a+ B isd + et+i (5)
wherersd,1 is the realized standard deviation from t tot+l,and
isd is the forecast of the standard deviation from t to t+l that is
implicit in the option price observed in the market at tinet.The
null hypothesis is H0: B =1. One might also include the restriction
a=O as part of the null hypothesis, but we decided not to, so as to
focus on excess variability as the alternative hypothesis. This
makes the test more conservative, in the sense that it is more
difficult to reject H0 than otherwise.
The results of regression (5) for the four exchange rates are
reported in Panel A of Table 1. Notice that for each of the four
currencies, the null B =1 is rejected at the 5% level. In fact, the
B's in two of the four equations are not significantly different
from zero at the 5% level. The point estimates are all smaller than
one, suggesting that market participants tend to overpredict the
magnitude of volatility. They would be wise in their forecasts to
put more weight on the long-run average volatility. The quote given
at the beginning of the paper seems appropriate: 'it would be wise
to cut expectations in half."
If there is heteroskedasticity in the data, the standard errors
can be underestimated. This c6uld cause the null hypothesis to be
incorrectly rejected even when it is true. To examine this
possibility, White's test of heteroskedasticity is performed and the
results are reported in Panel A of Table 1. The hypothesis of no
heteroskedasticity is rejected for the German Nark at the five
percent level, but not for the other three currencies. Standard
errorscan also be reestimated using White's method of correcting
11for unknown heteroskedasticity. The results are in the square
brackets in Panel A of Table 1. The standard errors are generally
larger than without the correction. But even with this correction,
the null hypothesis that the slope parameter is one can be rejected
for all four currencies at the five percent level.
One may also wonder about the possibility of a structural break
in the sample. We split the sample into two equal-sized subsaniples,
and use a Chow test to examine for structural break. The results are
reported in the last column of Panel A, Table 1.Except for the
British Pound, there is no evidence of a structural break at the
five percent level.
The first moments of exchange rate changes are known to be
highly correlated across currencies, and it is likely that the
second moments are as well.To take advantage of the possible
cross—currency correlations, we use the method of seemingly
unrelated regression (SUR) to estimate the four equations as a
system. Because the STiR method takes into account cross—equation
restrictions on the covariance matrix of the error terms, it should
yield more efficient estimator of the B's. The results using SUR
are reported in Panel B of Table 1. Again, the null hypothesis of
unbiasedness is rejected for all four currencies at the 5% level.
(Table-i about here]
Before concluding that isd is a biased estimator of the rsd, we
will note two types of problems that could conceivably invalidate
the test. The first problem is the possibility of incorrect size
of the test. This problem will be more carefully examined in the
next subsection.The second problem is related to observations
derived from option contracts with overlapping time to maturity.
Before the end of 1985 options were available only at four
maturity dates:March, June, September and December.Monthly
series of isd necessarily contain overlapping time periods.
Overlapping time periods in isd would cause serial correlation of
the prediction errors for isd, and thus e.1 in (5) would not be
12white noise. Toovercome this problem, we have redone the Sun on
asub—sample that excludes the observations with overlapping
horizons.' The results are reported in Panel C of Table 1. From
Panels B and CofTable 1, we see that after correcting for
overlappingobservations, the SUR estimates of 13's are still
statistically different from one, which confirms the finding in
Panels A and B of the sante table.
One might worry about possible non—stationarity in the data
that could invalidate the tests. We performed a Dickey-Fuller test
for unit roots on the rsd series, and found that the null hypothesis
of a unitroot is rejected for the four currencies. When the SUR
estimation is redone for variables in first—differenced form, the
13estimates are still statistically different from one. To save
space, these results are not reported here.
OLS estimation equation—by—equation and SUR estimation, with or
without correcting overlapping observations, all point to the same
conclusion: that the null (H0: 13=1) is overwhelmingly rejected.
This says that the implied standard deviation is a biased predictor
of the realized standard deviation in the exchange market.
3.2Non—normality and size of the test in small samples: Some
simulationresults
The point estimation and hypothesis testing reported above
depend on assumptions made about the regression model. In
particular, these include an assumption that the error term in the
equation(5) has a normal distribution.7 As the standard deviation
•Wecould apply Hansen and Hodrick's (1980) method of moments
to correct for problems with overlapping observations.However,
since the fraction of the data that come from overlapping contracts
is small, we lose only a few observations by simply dropping those
observations.
We know that the levelof exchange rates is characterized by
leptokurtosis and moderate skewness, particularly in high frequency
data (see, for example, Boothe and Classman, 1987). It is possible
that the standard deviation series of exchange rates (or its
13can never be less than zero, its true distribution cannot literally
be normal.But then the question naturally arises whether our
estimates and inference are still valid.
First, we know that in large samples, non—normality does not
matter: The slope estimator will be consistent and asymptotically
normal, as long as the regressor is uncorrelated with the error
term, which is true under the null hypothesis of rational
expectations. Second, even in small samples, the estimator is still
unbiased. However, the distribution of the estimator in a small
sample is not guaranteed to be normal.Given that the null of
unhiasedness is rejected in the previous subsection, a relevant
question for us is how sensitive the size of the test is to
non—normal distributions of the error term. This is the subject of
investigation in this subsection.
One way of checking sensitivity to the normality assumption is
to run the regressions with all variables in logarithms instead of
in levels. The log-normal distribution has the advantage that it
implies that the standard deviation can never be negative.6 The
results are presented in Table 2. Two features are evident. First,
the slope estimates are all statistically different from one at the
5% level for all four currencies. This is true whether the OLS or
SUR method is used. The point estimates here are generally smaller
than the corresponding ones in Table 1.Second, the intercept
estimates are all statistically different from zero.
[Again, the White's test of heteroskedasticity is performed and
heteroskedasticity_consistent standard error are estimated. The
logarithmictransformation) also has a non—normal distribution.
It is possible that the logarithmic transformation could
actually introduce bias into the hypothesistesting. Ifthe implied standarddeviation in levels is an unbiased estimator of the
realized standard deviation in levels, Jensen's inequality implies
that the logarithm of the [sd is not an unbiased estimator of the
logarithm of the rsd. But the Black-.Scholes formula does not give
us any reason to choose the level of the standard deviation over the
log. (Under the assumptions of the formula, the standard deviation
isknown withcertainty, so that there is no issue.)
14White's test indicates that there is problem of heteroskedasticity
for British pound and Japanese yen. But even when correct for the
heteroskedasticity using the White's method, the results of the
hypothesis testing regarding the slope parameter are unaffected.
[Table 2 about here]
Let us now formally examine the moment properties of the
residuals from OLS regressions, presented in Table 3.Panel A
reports the properties of OLS residuals from regressions with
variables in levels. The skewness of the residuals for the British
Pound, GermanMark,Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc is, respectively,
1.0967, 0.564, 1.584, and 0.9317. In a chi—square test, all four
are statistically different from the skewness of a normal
distribution at the five percent level.The kurtosis of the
residuals for the four currencies is, respectively, 5.053, 3.237,
6.281, and 3.936. Based on a chi-square test at the 5% level, the
kurtosis parameters for the British Pound, Japanese yen and Swiss
Franc are also statistically different from those of a normal
distribution. In individual Jarque-Bera tests, the null of
normality is rejected for three of the four currencies at the five
percent level. Panel B reports similar statistics for residuals
from OLS regressions with variables expressed in logarithms. Here,
the kurtosis parameters are no longer statistically different from
those of a normal distribution. The Jarque—Bera tests also fail to
reject the null hypothesis of normality at the five percent level.
Thissuggests that the logarithmic transformation indeed makes the
residuals much closer to normality.However, the four skewness
parametersare still statistically different from those of a normal
distribution. In other words the deviation from normality, although
smaller, does not vanish completely.
[Table 3 about here]
Having established that the errors are not normal, we proceed
15to investigate whether we reject the null of unbiasedness too much
in our sample.We generate 1000 samples according to the null
hypothesis and count the number of rejections using a t—statistic
and its conventional critical value. Specifically, we specify the
error term, z, as follows:
z h [eht_Mt0.S}
where w is a normal variate with mean z and variance g.The
advantage of this specification is that the moments of z can be
easily computed with the aid of the moment generating function of
a normal variate. For example, zcan be shown to have the following







In principle, for any arbitrary distribution of the error term
we can, by appropriately choosing /4,gand h, use z to match any
given three moments of the distribution (in addition to the zero
mean). Sometimes this can not be done perfectly. For example, the
skewness and kurtosis coefficients involve only one parameter.
However, this will not be a serious problem for us as will be clear
later. Table 4 shows how skewness and kurtosis change as g (or r)
increases. It is clear both are inonotonically increasing functions
of the parameter. If we choose (hz, g, h) to be (0, 0.07, 0.01265),
we can approximate reasonably well the average magnitude of sample
variance, skewness and kurtosis of the OLS residuals as reported in
Table 3.
[Table 4 about here]
16We do 14 different permutations of the triple of parameters (we
restrict p to be zero). For each chosen triple of the parameter,
we generate one thousand samples of size 85 under the null that the
slope coefficient is one (and intercept is 0.03), and compute the
percentage of times we reject the null with a conventional t test
at five percent significance level. The results are reported in
Table 5.
[Table 5 about here]
First of all, we vary g in the neighborhood of 0.07 while
keeping h fixed at 0.01265.As g varies from 0.04 to 1, the
skewness of the error term, z, varies from a low of 0.614 to a high
of 6.18, the kurtosis from 3.678 to 113.94. Column (6) reports the
tne" size of the test in the simulation, Column (7) the average
point estimate of the slope. The point estimate is very close to
one. The percentage of rejection is somewhere between 5.2 percent
and6.6percent. Therefore, the true size of the test in the small
sampledue to non—normality is higher than 5percent, but not by
much.This is true even in the case of very high skewness and
kurtosisfor the error term.
Next, we vary the value of h in theneighborhood of 0.01265,
keeping g at 0.07. As h changes from 0.01165 to 0.110, the variance
of the error term changes from 10.55*10.6 to 940.96*l0. Again we
can see that the average point estimate is quite close to one and
the percentage of times rejecting the null is not much different
from5 percent.
Tosuxñmarize, our simulations are designed to examine whether
deviations from normality can cuse too many rejections of the t
test in small samples. Within the family of non-normal
distributions chosen here, the answer is no. The true size of the
test is only slightly different from 5 percent, even when we vary
the variance, skewness and kurtosis of the error distribution to a
considerablylarge magnitude relative to their actual magnitude in
thesample. Therefore, the rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis
17in the previous subsection seems to be robust to the distributional
Section 4. weak rationality andanonparainetric test
It would be disturbing to conclude that market participants are
so foolish that they make forecastA that are completely irrelevant
to subsequent realized events. Therefore, we continue our study
here by looking at a weaker version of rationality. This version
of rationality says that market participants are forward—looking and
can predict the direction of the change in exchange rate volatility.
It is weaker than the version of rational expectations tested in
section 3.1, because it looks only at the direction of the change
as opposed to the magnitude of the change.
In Tables 1 and 2, most of the slope estimates, though less
than one, were statistically significantly grater than zero. So
we already know that the market's anticipated volatility Ia
informativein one sense: it can help predict the realized
volatility relative to its sample mean. Here we test whether the
option—implied volatility is informative about the direction of
change in the realized standard deviation relative to its last
period's value. We take as our null hypothesis that the
option—implied standard deviation is useless as a forecast of the
future realized change in the standard deviation. Included in the
null hypothesis is the possibility that the isd fails to beat the
random walk as a description of the standard deviation, which
predicts that the expected change is always zero.
The test is non—parametric in nature and thus is robust to
distributional assumptions of the exchange rate process. In
addition, it permits non-stationarity of conditional probabilities
over time. It was developed by Henriksson and Merton (1981) in the
context of mutual fund performance evaluation, and adapted by
Of course, the simulation results are valid only up to the
family of distributions that has been considered.
18Havenner and Modjtahedi (1988) and Lai (1990) to examine the
usefulness of foreign exchange forecasts.
Let p1 be the conditional probability of making a successful
forecast when the realized standard deviation in the subsequent
period decreases or does not change, and p2 the conditional
probability of making a successful forecast when the realized
standard deviation increases. I.e., p1Prob[Aisd￿0 and
p2Prob(Aisd>0 IArsd>0J. Henriksson and Merton (1981) show that
a sufficient statistic for evaluating weak rationality is Pl+P2.A
necessaryand sufficient condition for the market's forecast to have
no value is that Pl+P2 =1. For example, a forecaster always using
arandom walk process would have p1=l, p2=O and p1+p21.
Let nl be the number of times Arsd￿0 and n2 number of times
Arsd>0. N=ni+n2 is the total sample size. Let ml be the number of
successful forecasts in the sample when Arsd￿0, m2 number of
unsuccessful forecasts when £rsd>0. M=ml+m2 is the total number of
times Aisd￿O in the entire sample. By definition, p1=E(ml/nl) and
p2='1—E(m2/n2)
Under the null hypothesis that the market forecasts are
useless, H: p1+p2=i, we have E(ml/nl)=E(m2/n2)=pl. Henriksson and
Merton show that under the null, the probability distribution for
mi——thenumber of correct forecasts, given that ársd￿O ——hasthe
form ofa hypergeometric distribution and is independent of both p1
andp2.I.e.,
[ni'\ fn2\
=x/M-x) Pr(mlx / ni, n2, M) _________
(N
lx
Thisis the basis of the test. However, the computation of the
teststatistic is difficult for even moderate numbers of ml, nl and
n2, since factorial and gamma function are cumbersome to calculate.
Fortunately, a normal distribution approximation is available for
the hypergeometric distribution. The approximation is very accurate
evenfor small samples, as long as ni is roughly equal to N/2. The
19parameters used for this normal approximation are the mean and
variancefor the hypergeometric distribution, which can be written
as follows: E(ml) =Nfl/Nand var(ml)mlnln2(N-M)/[N2(N—l)].
Table 6 presents results of applying this nonparametric test to
our data.In the actual calculations, we take out all the data
points that involve contracts of overlapping maturities (as
explained in footnote 4). As a result, we have 64 data points for
each of the four currencies. We then look at both a one—tail test
(corresponding to an alternative: p1+p2>l) and a two—tail test
(corresponding to an alternative: p1+p2*l). From Table 6, it can be
seen that the null hypothesis of useless forecasts is rejected for
the four currencies, individually and jointly, and for both one-tail
and two—tail tests, at five percent significance level. For the
British Pound for example, out of 64 sample points, Arsd￿0 30 times.
Out of these 30 down times, the market got 27 correct forecasts.
The point estimate of p1+p21.282. Corresponding to a critical
value at the 5 percent, the required ml to reject the null is 24.65
for a one—tail test and 25.06 for a two—tail test, when a normal
approximation is used to compute the test statistic.Since the
actual value of m1 is 27, the null hypothesis that isd is useless
is rejected at the five percent level for both tests. Similarly,
the point estimates of p1+p2 for the German Mark, Japanese Yen and
Swiss Franc are 1.375, 1.356 and 1.291, respectively. They are all
statistically different from one at the five percent level for both
the one—tail and two—tail tests. If we pool the four currencies
together, the null hypothesis of isd being useless is also rejected
at the five percent level for both the one—tail and the two-tail
tests.
[Table 6 about here
Given the overwhelming rejections of the null hypothesis, we
might ask again how sensitive the probability of type—one error is
to the small size of the sample when normal approximations are
employed. In other words, does the test reject too much when the
20market forecasts are actually useless? Luckily, Henriks6on and
Merton have conducted some simulations to check the true size of the
test in small samples when normal approximation is employed to
compute the statistic. They found that the size of the test is not
much influenced by normal approximation in a sample as small as 50
data points, provided that nI is closeto N12. Since for all four
of our currencies, nl is quite close to half of the total sample
size, we can safely conclude that the rejections of the null are not
caused by unusually large type—one errors.
In conclusion, even though the previous section rejects the
strong version of rationality by parametric regression method, this
section finds that a weaker version of rationality is supported by
the data. While the market ex ante anticipation of exchange rate
volatility may not be an unbiased estimate of the magnitude of the
realized volatility, it does rationally forecast the direction of
change in the realized volatility. The market forecast
unambiguouslyoutperforms some naive forecast rules, such as a
random walkrule, as far as direction of change is concerned.
Section5. The formation of theisdandpatternof the expectational
errors
One naturally wonders how market participants form their
estimate of the exchange volatility to be used in currency options.
Specifically, we investigate three questions in this section. The
first question is whether investors lean from their forecast errors
inthe past and whether they effectively have adaptive expectations.
Second, we examine if the exkectational errors are serially
correlated. Third, we examine the possibility that the nature of
the forecasting errors is best described by saying that market
participants put too much weight on recently observed volatility,
and not enough on the long—run average volatility.
215.1 The possibility of learning and adaptive expectations
Let us define the difference between the realizedand market
forecasted standard deviations, rsd,1—isd, as the expectation error
at time t. To see if market participants learn from their mistakes,
we regress the implied standard deviation on last period's
predictionerror (and last periotl's isd). The result is reported
in Table 7. (This regression uses the SUR method on non-overlapping
observations.)The point estimates for the adaptive expectations
parameter, which is the coefficient on last period's prediction
error, range from 0.2266 for the Swiss Franc to 0-3035 for the
British Pound.They are all positive and all statistically
different from zero.This says that when last period's isd.1
overpredicts rsd by 1 unit, market participants on average adjust
this period's prediction isd downward by about 0.27 units.
The point estimates of the coefficient for last period's isd
are similar in magnitude to the coefficient on the contemporaneous
prediction error.'°This suggests that a proper specification
might simply have market participants form their forecasts of future
volatility based only on recent observed volatility. We will pursue
this idea in section 5.3.
[Table 7 about here]
5.2 serial correlation in the expectational errors
One implication of the rational expectations hypothesis is that
the expectational errors should be serially uncorrelated. A finding
of positive serial correlation would imply that the adaptive
expecations parameter estimated in the preceding section is lower
than is optimal. We formally test this implication now with the
°Theyare statistically significantly greater than zero,
ranging from from 0.2647 for the Swiss Franc to 0.5019 for the
Pound. This means that if last period's forecast, isd.1 is high,
then this period's forecast, isd, tends to be high, and vice versa.
22Portmanteau Q—test. The results of the test for lags 1,3,5,7,9 and
11 are reported in Table 8.
One can see that for the Pound, Yen and Swiss Franc, there is
evidence that the expectational errors are serially correlated. For
example, with P=l, the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is
rejected for the Swiss Franc at 5% level. With P=9 and 11, the null
hypothesis is rejected for both the Pound and Yen at the 10 % level.
The expectational errors for the German mark, in contrast, appear
to be serially uncorrelated for all lags. To summarize, there is
some evidence that the expectational errors are serially correlated,
but the evidence is not strong.
[Table 8 about here]
5.3 Do investors put too much weight on recent volatility?
In section 3 we saw that ——whateverinformation investors base
their forecasts of future volatility on -—theyappear to put too
much weight on that information and not enough on the long-run
average level of volatility. But we said nothing there about what
information investors use. There has been a great deal of empirical
research, most of it using ARCH and GARCHtechniques,showing that
lagged volatility is a key variable, both in describing the actual
process that generates volatility and in describing themodel to
which investors appear from their economic behavior to subscribe."
Textbooks instruct would-be options traders to use historical
volatility to price options. A natural question, then, is whether
the nature of investors' systematic forecast errors can be described
as putting greater weight on lagged volatility than is optimal.
Table 9 reports regressions against the previous two lags of
the realized standard deviation. For each currency, the dependent
variable in the first equation tested is the isd. In each case, the
'Forexample, GarmanandKlass (1980) [and Hsieh and Nanas—
Anton(1988)1.
23lagged r&d is indeed a statistically significant determinant of the
isd (and in most cases the twice-lagged rsd is as well).The
dependent variable in the second test for each currency is the
realized r&d over the coming period. In each case, the lagged r&d
is again a statistically significant determinant.
In three out of four cases, the coefficient in the isd
regression is greater than the coefficient in the r&d regression.
In other words, the lagged volatility is not quite as important a
determinantof the future volatility as market participants think
it is.Is this difference statistically significant? To answer
this question, the third test for each currency regresses the
difference between the rsd and isd against the lagged volatilities.
None of the negative coefficientsis statistically different from
zero.Thus, although the point estimates suggest that market
participantsmay be putting too much weight on the lagged
volatility, the significance levels are not high enough to allow us
to conclude with any confidence that this is indeed the nature of
the mistake that they are making.
[Table 9 about here]
6. Another technique for testing the relationship between the
expectational errors and the level of the expectations
In this section, we continue to examine the existence of the
systematic pattern in the expectational errors that was uncovered
in section 3. We use the Alternating Conditional Expectations (ACE)
algorithm to provide some clues to the search. The ACE algorithm
is a non—parametric procedure, designed to find the optimal
transformations (possibly non—linear) of the dependent variable and
a set of explanatory variables so as to minimize the mean squared
crrors in regressions.
To ease interpretations, we restrict the transformations on the
realized standard deviations (the dependent variable), to be linear.
Under the null hypothesis that the isd is an unbiased estimator of
24the rsd, one expects the required ACE transformation of the isd (the
explanatory variable) to be linear, too.'The results of the ACE
procedure are reported in Figures 2—5. Figure 2 is the ACE result
for the British Pound. The top graph is a scatter plot of the
ACE—transformed rsd series against the original rsd series. It is
linear by construction. The bottom graph is a scatter plot of the
ACE—transformed isd series against the original series. Figures 3,
4 and 5 are similar pairs of scatter plots for the German Mark,
Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc. The scale of all the transformed
series is normalized to have zero mean.
From the bhttom graphs in each figure, we can see the type of
transformation of the implied standard deviation required in order
to maximize the correlation between them and the corresponding
realized standard deviation series. Two characteristics of the isd
series are suggested by these plots. First, for all of the four
currencies, the required transformation of isd is not linear, as
would be the case under the unbiasedness hypothesis. Second, with
the exception of the Yen, there is a common pattern to the required
transformation of the isd series. The transformation of the two
tails is different from that of the middle range. In general, when
the isd gets big relative to its mean (i.e.,on the right tails), ACE
assigns a smaller weight relative to the weights assigned to isds
around the mean. When the isd gets small relative to its mean(i.e.,
on the left tails), ACE raises the weight relative to the weights
assigned to isd's around the mean. This is true for the Yen too,
except that the changes in weights in this case are more dramatic
than for the other currencies.Based on these results, we
hypothesize that the market expectations are overly excited on the
two tails. When the market predicts a high volatility next month,
it tends to overpredict (i.e., it predicts too high a volatility
relative to the true one). When it predicts a low volatility in the
following month, the market also tends to overpredict (i.e., it
predicts too low a volatility relative to the true one).
This suggests that the market does overpredict the deviations
of isd from its mean either when it predicts a high or a ow
25volatility. To echo the quote from the beginning of the paper, "it
would be wise to cut expectations' a bit for the market.
Section 7: Overview and conclusions
This paper investigates the rationality of the market in
forming its ex ante anticipation of the one—month—ahead exchange
rate volatility for four currencies from February of 1983 to January
of 1990. The market ex ante anticipation of exchange volatility is
inferred from call option contracts on foreign currencies. We first
examined a strong version of the rational expectations question: Is
the implied standard deviation an unbiased predictor of the future
realized standard deviation? We found that strong rationality is
overwhelmingly rejected.This is true both in OLS and in SUlk
estimations, with or without correction for overlapping
observations. Because there exists evidence of non—normality in the
residuals of the OLS regressions, we then used a simulation method
to determine whether the rejection of the strong rationality could
be caused by incorrect size of the test in small samples. We found
that the size of the test is not altered very much even if we
consider distributions with much higher variance, skewness and
kurtosis than observed from the OLS residuals. Thus, the rejection
of strong rationality seems to be robust to the distributional
assumption.
Some caution in the interpretation of the rejection of
unbiasedness is in order before concluding that expectations are not
rational. It is always possible that the market anticipation of
volatility is incorrectly estimated. One candidate explanation is
that,contrary to the assumption underlying the Black—Scholes and
Garman—Kohihagen formulas, the spot exchange rate process contains
significant jumps.It could be a mixture of diffusion ahd jump
processes,as proposed by Jorion (1988), Ball and Roma(1990) and
Bates (1990). If the market participants take this into account in
forming their anticipations, the anticipated volatility inferred by
the Garman—Kohlhagen formula may be incorrect as an estimate of
26investors' forecasts.'2 The magnitude of this effect on the point
estimates and hypothesis—testing needs to be examined more carefully
in future research. But even if the observed bias is due to the
failure of one of the Garman—lcohlhagen assumptions rather than
investors' mistakes, an important finding stands: the implicit
volatilities extracted from options prices in the standard way are
not optimal forecasts of future volatilities.
A weaker version of rationality was also examined: the market
can rationally forecast the direction of change, regardless of the
magnitude of the change.A nonparametric test developed by
Henriksson and Merton was employed. The test is robust to the form
of the distribution of the standard deviation process and can permit
certain forms of nonstationarity. Here, the null hypothesis of the
market anticipation being useless is overwhelmingly rejected. The
market anticipation satisfies the weaker rationality condition.
As to the question of how the market forms its anticipations,
we find some evidence of learning behavior and adaptive
expectations. When the expectational error series are examined by
the Portinanteau Q test, some evidence is found for the presence of
serial correlation, suggesting that the investors may not adapt
quickly enough.On the other hand there is also weak evidence
suggesting that they may put excessive weight on the most recent
volatility.
When an ACE algorithm is performed on the isd and rsd series,
it seems that the market is overexcited on both tails of the isd
series. That is to say, when the market predicts a high volatility,
it tends topredicttoo high a value; when it predicts a low
volatility, it tends to predict too low a value.The central
finding of the paper is that expectational errors, rsd.1— isd, are
12Anotherpossible interpretation, however, is that, because
the Garman-Xohlhagen formula is knowntobe widely used in the
markets, the extracted volatilities are what the market has in mind,
regardless whether the assumptions underlying the derivation of the
formula are correct, and that therefore our results do after all
suggest bias in investors' formation of expectations.
27negatively related to the level of the expectations, isd. Market
participants could improve their forecasts of future volatility by
putting more weight on the long—run average.
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32Tablet: Testing the unbinsedness of the ISD, 1983:2-1990:1
rsd,1.a +flisd +c,1
Currency p adj.R2 DWWhite's testChow's test
£01.2 estimation, whole sample (N=85)








ITY 0.005130 0.1058 -0.008 1.61 3.102 L851
(0.000993)' (0.1850)# {0.212} {0.164}
10.001246]' [0.2288]
SF 0.00524 1 0.2869 0.027 1.33 2.790 0.630
(0.000999)' (0.1564)# {0.248J {0.535}
[0.001.237]' (0.2010]
B. STIR estimation, whole sample (N=85)
BP 0.003726' 0.5299# 0.31 1.53
(0.000557) (0.0845)
PM 0.005048' 0.2633'# 0.18 1.47
(0.000522) (0.0749)
0.005185' tL09S4 # 0.003 1.61
(0.000787) (0.1441)
SF 0.005770' 0.2011'# 0.039 1.31
(0.000506) (0.0703)
C. SUIt estimation. excludingdatafrom contracts with overlapping maturities (M 64)
EP 0.00497' 0.3049'3q 0.053 1.57
(0.00077) (0.1281)
PM 0.00553' 0.1859 # 0.096 1.53
(0.00062) (0.0954)
JY 0.00503' 0.1806 # 0.016 1.78
(0.00080) (0.1506)
SF 0.00582' 0.2167'# 0.029 1.64
(0.00064) (0.0970)
Motes:
(1) Standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) Ileteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in square brackets.
(3) P-values are in curly brackets.
(4) •denotesthat the estimate is statistically different from zero at 5% level.
(5) iV denotes that the estimate is statistically different from one at 5% level.Table 2: Testing the unbiasednessofthe 1Sf), 1983:2-1990:1
IoØrsd,1) =a . log(isd) +
Currency a adj.R2 DWWhite's testChow's test
A. OLS estimation, whole sample (N =85)
BP -2-555 0.4811 0.18 1.51 9.431 6.506'
(0 5635)' (0 1085)'# {0.009}' (0 002J'
10.75491' [0.1465]'
DM -2247 0.5515 0.15 1.57 1.2641 0.226
(0.7170)' (0.1399)'# {0.531} {0.798}
L0.6752]' [0.1306]'
JY -4.9322 0.0575 001 1.61 8.2812 2.128
(0-7756) • (03464)# {0.016}• {0.126}
11,0768]' [0.2049]
SF -3.4850 0.2992 0.04 1.28 0.8786 0.8139
(0.7012)' (0.1378)'# jO.644} {0.447}
[0.76571' [0.1487]
B. SUE estimation, whole sample (TN=85)
B? -3.0693 0.3818# 0.19 1.51
(0.4264) (0.0824)
DM -3.7551' 0.2569# 0.16 1.45
(0.3750) (0.0729)
.JY -4.6656 0.1079# 0.002 1.62
(0.610 1) (0.1150)
SF -3.832 0.2314"# 0.054 1.26
(0.3365) (0.0652)
C. STIR estimation, excluding data from contracts with overlapping maturities (N 64)
B? -3.7569 0,248r# 0.039 1.53
(0.5558) (0.1063)
DM -3.8597' 0.2346# 0.12 1.56
(0.4703) (0.0907)
JY -4.4147' 0.1452 0 0.008 1.80
(0.6296) (0.1178)
SF -3.7658' 0.238&# 0.051 1.5.4
(0.4220) (0.0815)
Notes:
(1)Standard errors are in parentheses.
(2) ileteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in square brackets.
(3) P-vaiues are incurlybrackets.
(4)•denotesthat the estimate is statistically different from zero at 5% level.
(5) # denotes that the estimate is statistically different from one at 5% level.Table 3:Properties of the OhS residuals and tests of normality
A. Residuals from theOLSregressions in levels:rsd..1=+Pisd+e,1
B? OM JY SF
U2'10 4.926 4.612 4.900 5.821
U) •iü9 11.990 5.584 17.179 13.086
111012 122.584 68.851 150.779 133.399
skewness 1.097 0.564 1.584 0.932
kurtosis 5•Q53* 3.237 6.281 3.936
.Jarque-Bera 31.967 4.701 73.669 15.403
B. Residuals from the OhS regressions in logarithnt
Iog(rsd,) =a + 1og(isd)
BP Dli JY SF
a2 .102 10.333 10.202 12.778 10.766
7.296 -9.470 12.449 5.618
144'10 429.220 338.090 573.136 327.915
skewness 0.220 -0.291' 0.273' 0.159'
kurtosis 4.020 3.248 3.510 2.829
Jarque-Bera 4.368 1.414 1.974 0.462
(1) Uj denotes thefth central moment. Skewness =U)iI.Kurtosisu4/u.
(2),Jarque-Bera statistic =T{[S2161+[(k_3)2/24}},where T is the sample size, S the
skewness, and K the kurtosis. Under the nuil hypothesis of normality, the Jarque-Bera
statistic has a CM-square distribution wilit 2 detrees of freedom. The critical value at 5%
levelis5.991. Under the null hypothesis of normality, T[S2/6] and T[(K_3)2124],
individually, has a Chi-square distribution With 1degreeof freedom. The critical values
of S and K to reject the null at5%level,are0.05207 and 4.0414,respectively.
(3)*denotes"different from that undernormAlityat 5% level.'
Notes:Table 4: Skewness and kurtosis of zasa function of y
(with h being positive)
y exp (y) Skewness KurLosis
0,0001 1.000100 0.030001 3.001600
0.01 1.010050 0.301759 3.162323
0.05 1.051271 0.690903 3.860583
0.1 1.105170 1.007008 4.855750
0.3 1.349858 1.981403 10.70567
0.5 1.648721 2.938708 21.50727
0.7 2.013752 ,4.041258 41.94258
0.04 1.040810 0.614294 3.678365
0.07 1.072508 0.82734.4 4.241307
0.1 1.105170 1.007008 4.855750
0.13 1,138828 1.169517 5.526779
0.4 1.491824 2.4.48824 15.26988
0.7 2.013752 4.041258 4L94258
1 2.718281 6.184877 113.9363
Notes:
(1)Let wbea normal variate with mean uandvariance y. z is defined as follows;
z=h[exp(w) —exp(u+0.5y)).
(2) If h is negative, then all the skewness would also be negative (with the same magnitude
as in the table).Table 5: Simulation for size of the t-test under non-normality
(sample size=85,repetition sizepersimulation=1000)
parameters -—-impliedproperties of z— t-test pointestimate
h •io? var(z)skewness kw-tosis true average p
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) size
(6)
12.650.04 6.79720.614294 3.678365 0.066 0.9986
12.650.07 12.444 0.827344 4.241307 0.056 1.0028
12.650.1 18.600 1.007008 4.855750 0.057 1.0100
12.650.13 2&3001.1695175.526779 0.052 1.0035
1.2.650.4 117.412.4-4882415.26986 0.058 1.0049
12.650.7 326.684.04125841.94258 0.060 0.9640
12.65 1 747.436.184877 113.9363 0.058 1.0430
11.650.07 10.555 0.82734-44.241307 0.064 0.9963
12.650.07 12.4440.8273.444.241307 0.058 0.9931
13.650.07 14.4890.8273444.241307 0.056 0.9013
14M50.07 16.6900.8273444.241307 0.063 0.9965
20 0.07 31.106 0.827344 4.241307 0.058 0.9714
50 0.07 194.410.8273444.241307 0.052 1.0501
80 0.07 497.700.827344 4.241307 0.048 0,9341
110 0.07 940.960.8273444.241307 0.049 0.8987
-12.650.04 6.7972-0.614294&678365 0.061 0.9977
-12.850M7 12.444-0.8273444.241307 0050 1.0045
-12.650.1 18.600-1.0070084$55750 0.068 1.0043
-12.650.13 25.300-1.1695115.526779 0.049 1.0121
-12.653.4 111.41-2.44882415.26988 0.070 0.9798
-12.650.7 326.684.04125841.94258 0.049 1.0417
-12.65 1 747.43-6.184877113.9363 0.048 1.0033
Note:
Seethenotesfor Table4 for the definitions of Ja, y and z.Table 6: Test of the weaker version of rationality
(Datafromoverlapping contracts excluded)
H0:p1-p2a1.(lad is uselessaspredictor of rod)
in1 needed to reject
H0
CurrencyN 2Min1in3nj1p1 +p21-tail test2-tail test
BP 6430 34 48272130 1.282 24.66" 25.06"
DM 6432 32 4-42816321.375 24.15" 24.56"
,JY 6431 33 44271731 1,356 23.72" 24.188
SF 6429 35 46252029 1.291 22.&r 23.07"
Total 256122134181107741221.325 90.S'P 91.75"
(1)PoInt estimate of (p P2 =(m1/n) +(n2—m2)/n2-
(2) m,amaxt0, m—n2}, m1=min{n1, M).
(3) •denotesthat the null hypothesis that the market's forecast is useless is rejected at 5%
leveL
Notes:Table 7: Factors that affect 181), 1983:2 - 1990:1
is00.01(rsd—isd_1).03isd1 +error
SUIt estimation, excluding data from overlappingcontracts.
Currency 00 adj.R2 DW
BP 0.00245 0.3035 0.5019 0.52 1.84
(0.00041) (0.0525) (0.638)
1DM 0.00312' 0.2946' 0.4264' 0.40 2.10
(0.00046) (0.0530) (0.0720)
JY 0.00328' 0.2409 0.2898 0.19 2.21
(0.00055) (0.0506) (0.0969)
SF 0.00406 0.2266' 0.2647' 0.20 2.02
(0.00056) (0.0558) (0.0827)
Notes:
(1)The standard errors are in the parentheses.
(2) • denotes that the estimate in question is statistically different from zero at 5% leveL
TableS: The Portmanteau Qtestof the expectational errors, 1983:2-1990:1
H0:rsd,1 -isdis seriallyuzicorrelated
Lag P Q-BP Q4)M QJY Q-SF Criticalvalue torejectH0
a =0.05 a—0.10
1 0.34 1.69 2.46 6.58' 3.8.41 2.71
3 5.05 1.85 6.974' 7.524' 7.815 6.25
5 6.93 3.40 8.85 7.68 11.07 9.24
7 8.78 8.78 14.& 12.34' 14.07 12.02
9 16.0# 10.3 17.3' 12.6 18.31 15.99
11 17.6# 11.4 17.94' 14.2 19.68 17.28
Notes:
(1) The standard errors are in the parentheses.
(2)•denotesthe null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected at 5% level.
(3) 4' denotes the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is rejected at 10% level.Table 9: DoInvestors RespondToo Much to Lagged Volatility?
(1983:4 -1990:2)
Independent Variable
DependentVariable c logrsd(-i)log rsd(-2) DW S.E.E.
Durbin'sI'
IogBPISD -t.M7 0.5135 0.2071 0.474 £39 0.240
(0.433) (0.0819) (0.0825)
IoEBPRSD 2221* 0.3656 0.1945# 0.216 1.97 0.322
(0.581) (0.1098) (0.1106) (-0.004)
IogBPRSD-IogBPISD -0.6747 -0.1479 -0.0125 -0.0015 1.64 0.370
(0.6673) (0.1262) (0.1270)
1ogDMISD -2.6238 0.3849 0d096# 0.381 1.52 0.192
(0.3722) (0.0637) (0.0637)
IogDMRSD -3.351 0.3321 0.00602 0.091 2.01 0.335
(0.6488) (0.1111) (0.1110) (0.344)
IogDMRSD-IogDMISD -0.7269 -0.0528 -0.1035 -0.0042 0.326
(0.6319) (0.1082) (0.1082) 1.76
IogJYLSD -3.856 0.2470 0.0301 0.108 0.243
(0.59009) (0.0751) (0.0155) 1.71
IogJYRSD -3.761 0i783# 0.1034 0.026 0.359
(0.7414) (0.1112) (0.1118) 2.05
IogJYRSD-logJYJSD 0.0946 -0.0687 0.0733 -0.019 (-2.16) 0.438
(0.9041) (0.1356) (0.1363) 1.67
IogSFISD -3.148 0.1793' 0.2165' 0.171 0.236
(0.459) (0.0833) (0.0831) 1.57
IogSFRSD -2882' 0.393P 0.0319 0.145 0.315
(0.6123) (0.0319) (0.1110) 2.01
IogSFRSD-1ogSFISD 0.2665 0.2143# -1.1845 0.017 (0.031) 0.370
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